1 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600
2 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500
4 +GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h)
6 # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20
8 +# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable
13 @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:"
15 @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)"
16 @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543"
17 @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix"
18 - @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
19 + @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
20 @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4"
21 @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2"
24 # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx
25 #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc
27 -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX
28 -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
29 +# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux
30 +REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
33 #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec
35 LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \
36 EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all
43 @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
44 - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \
45 - NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all
46 + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
47 + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
48 + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
51 + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
52 + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
53 + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
54 + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
56 # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x.
57 hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10:
59 # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module
60 # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv().
65 #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o
68 # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work
69 # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions.
71 -BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
73 +#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
74 #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG
75 #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG
78 # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following
79 # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control.
81 -#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
84 ###############################################################
85 # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog()
87 # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions
88 # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn).
90 -#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
91 +STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
93 ################################################################
94 # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records
97 # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file.
99 -FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
100 +FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
102 # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged.
105 # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname
106 # lookups altogether, see the next section.
108 -PARANOID= -DPARANOID
109 +#PARANOID= -DPARANOID
111 ########################################
112 # Optional: turning off hostname lookups
114 # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid
115 # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition.
117 -HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
118 +#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
120 #############################################
121 # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking
122 @@ -649,28 +666,46 @@
123 # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives,
124 # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details.
126 -# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
127 +KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
129 ## End configuration options
130 ############################
132 # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs.
136 -.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
137 +.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c
143 +SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR)
144 +SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR)
145 +SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so
146 +SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap
148 -CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
150 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
152 +CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
153 $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \
154 -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \
155 -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \
156 $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \
157 $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME)
159 +SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS)
160 +SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT
162 LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \
163 hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \
164 $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \
165 update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o
167 +SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ));
171 KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \
172 @@ -684,46 +719,80 @@
173 refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \
174 scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS
178 -all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk
179 +all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB)
181 # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed.
184 @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; }
185 - @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
186 - if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
187 - then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
188 - else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \
189 + @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \
190 + if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \
191 + then rm cflags.new ; \
192 + else mv cflags.new cflags ; \
193 fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
194 + @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi
198 $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ)
202 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
203 +$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ)
205 + $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ)
206 + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ)
207 + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO)
209 +tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB)
210 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
212 -miscd: miscd.o $(LIB)
213 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
214 +miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB)
215 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
217 -safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB)
218 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
219 +safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB)
220 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
222 TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
224 -tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB)
225 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
226 +tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
227 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
229 -try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB)
230 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
231 +try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB)
232 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
234 TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
236 -tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB)
237 - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
238 +tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
239 + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
241 +install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
244 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
245 + ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
246 + ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
249 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
250 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
251 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
252 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
253 + install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
254 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
255 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
256 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
257 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
258 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
259 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
260 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
263 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
264 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
265 + install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
266 + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
267 + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
268 + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
275 rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \
277 + cflags libwrap*.so*
286 +weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h
287 workarounds.o: cflags
288 workarounds.o: tcpd.h
289 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500
290 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
293 unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp;
294 char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp;
295 +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
296 int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto;
297 +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
298 + size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf);
300 +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
302 int fd = request->fd;
304 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600
305 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
307 hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library
313 extern int allow_severity;
314 extern int deny_severity;
315 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600
316 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
318 impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
321 -An extended version of the access control language is described in the
322 -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
323 -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
324 +The extended version of the access control language is described in the
325 +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
326 +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
328 In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
329 network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
331 character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
334 -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
335 +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
336 This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
341 The access control language implements the following patterns:
343 -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
344 +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
345 the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For
346 -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
348 +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
351 -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
352 +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
353 its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the
354 -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
355 +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
356 Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
358 -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
359 +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
360 (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
361 member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
362 for daemon process names or for client user names.
364 -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
365 -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
366 -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
367 -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
368 -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
369 +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
370 +`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
371 +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
372 +pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
373 +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
375 +A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
376 +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
377 +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
378 +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
379 +separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere
380 +a host name or address pattern can be used.
382 The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
384 @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@
388 -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
389 +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
390 matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
391 \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
392 client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
393 -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
394 -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
395 +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
396 +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
400 If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
401 command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
402 The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
403 -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\'
404 +input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&'
405 at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
410 The client user name (or "unknown").
412 -Expands to a single `%\' character.
413 +Expands to a single `%' character.
415 Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
418 less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
419 client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
420 harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
421 -the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
422 +the client's IDENT server is lying.
424 -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
425 +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
427 The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
428 policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
431 ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
433 -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
434 +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
435 in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
436 netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
437 \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
442 -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
443 - /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
444 +in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
445 + /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
448 The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
450 capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
451 terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
452 expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
453 -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
454 +that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
458 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600
459 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
464 +/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
466 +static int hostfile_match(path, host)
468 +struct hosts_info *host;
474 + if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
475 + while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
478 + } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
479 + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
484 /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
486 static int host_match(tok, host)
488 tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */
491 + } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */
492 + return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
493 } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */
494 char *name = eval_hostname(host);
495 return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
496 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600
497 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
499 Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
500 performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
501 manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
502 -connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
503 +connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the
504 conversation with the client host. Example:
508 -spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) &
509 +spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) &
512 executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
513 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c 1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600
514 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
523 "local0", LOG_LOCAL0,
525 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600
526 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
531 -#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
532 +#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR)
533 extern char *sys_errlist[];
539 if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
540 +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR
541 + strcpy(bp, strerror(errno));
543 if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
544 strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]);
546 sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno);
552 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600
553 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
556 int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */
558 -static jmp_buf timebuf;
559 +static sigjmp_buf timebuf;
561 /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */
564 static void timeout(sig)
567 - longjmp(timebuf, sig);
568 + siglongjmp(timebuf, sig);
571 /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */
573 * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
576 - if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) {
577 + if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) {
578 signal(SIGALRM, timeout);
579 alarm(rfc931_timeout);
581 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
582 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
584 +.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
586 +safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff
589 +.B safe_finger [finger_options]
593 +command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this
594 +program for automatic reverse finger probes from the
597 +, not the raw finger command. The
599 +command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root
600 +privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH
603 +will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some
604 +finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in
605 +the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere
606 +on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps
607 +sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines.
608 +The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged.
610 +takes care of all this badness.
612 +.BR hosts_access (5),
613 +.BR hosts_options (5),
616 +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
618 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c 1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600
619 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
630 -char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin";
631 +char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin";
633 #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
634 #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
635 #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */
636 #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */
637 #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */
638 -#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */
639 +#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */
642 +int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
643 +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
647 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600
648 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
649 @@ -180,10 +180,12 @@
653 -void rfc931(request)
654 -struct request_info *request;
655 +void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
656 +struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin;
657 +struct sockaddr_in *our_sin;
660 - strcpy(request->user, unknown);
661 + strcpy(dest, unknown);
664 /* check_path - examine accessibility */
665 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600
666 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
669 static struct sockaddr_in client;
670 static struct sockaddr_in server;
671 +#if !defined (__GLIBC__)
673 +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
675 +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
677 int fd = request->fd;
682 struct sockaddr_in sin;
683 +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
684 int size = sizeof(sin);
685 +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
686 + size_t size = sizeof(sin);
687 +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
690 * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
691 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600
692 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
695 The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
696 systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
697 -no `in.\' prefix to their name.
698 +no `in.' prefix to their name.
700 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
701 are left in their original place.
702 @@ -110,26 +110,26 @@
706 -finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd
707 +finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd
711 The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
712 systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
713 -daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
714 +daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
715 field in the inetd configuration file.
717 Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
718 -covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
719 +covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
720 process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
721 -execute the `inetimp\' command.
722 +execute the `inetimp' command.
724 In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
725 or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
726 specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
729 - ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
730 + ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd
734 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600
735 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
737 * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
740 +#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
741 +#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
743 +/* someone else may have defined this */
746 +/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */
747 +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus)
748 +#define __P(args) args
750 +#define __P(args) ()
753 +/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */
754 +#include <netinet/in.h>
759 /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
761 #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */
763 char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */
764 struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */
765 struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */
766 - void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
767 - void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */
768 - void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */
769 - void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */
770 + void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
771 + void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */
772 + void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */
773 + void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */
774 struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */
778 /* Global functions. */
780 #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
781 -extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */
782 +extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */
784 #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */
787 -extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */
788 -extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */
789 -extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */
790 -extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
791 -extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */
792 -extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */
793 -extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */
794 -extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */
795 -extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */
796 +extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */
797 +extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */
798 +extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
799 +extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
800 +extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
801 +extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */
802 +extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */
803 +extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */
805 /* Global variables. */
807 +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
808 +extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
809 +extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
811 extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */
812 extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */
815 extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
816 extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
817 extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */
822 +extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request);
823 +extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr,
824 + char *client_user);
825 extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...);
826 extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...);
828 +extern int hosts_access();
829 +extern int hosts_ctl();
830 extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */
831 extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */
833 @@ -117,27 +146,31 @@
834 * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
837 -extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */
838 -extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */
839 -extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */
840 -extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */
841 -extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */
842 -extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */
843 +extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */
844 +extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */
845 +extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */
846 +extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */
847 +extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
848 +extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
849 #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */
850 #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */
852 /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
854 -extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */
855 -extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */
856 -extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */
857 +/* look up endpoint addresses */
858 +extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *));
859 +/* translate address to hostname */
860 +extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *));
861 +/* address to printable address */
862 +extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));
864 #define sock_methods(r) \
865 { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
867 /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */
869 #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
870 -extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
871 +extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
879 -extern void process_options(); /* execute options */
880 +extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */
881 extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */
883 /* Bug workarounds. */
885 #define strtok my_strtok
886 extern char *my_strtok();
892 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600
893 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
897 tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat);
898 + } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
899 + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat);
900 } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
901 tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat);
902 } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
905 if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
906 tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat);
907 + } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
908 + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat);
909 } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
910 tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat);
911 } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
913 static int check_host(pat)
920 + struct tcpd_context saved_context;
922 + char *wsp = " \t\r\n";
924 if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
927 tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled");
930 + } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */
931 + if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) {
932 + saved_context = tcpd_context;
933 + tcpd_context.file = pat;
934 + tcpd_context.line = 0;
935 + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
936 + tcpd_context.line++;
937 + for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp))
940 + tcpd_context = saved_context;
942 + } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
943 + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat);
945 } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */
946 if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE
947 || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE)
948 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
949 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
951 +.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
953 +try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper
959 +command can be called via a remote shell command to find out
960 +if the hostname and address are properly recognized
963 +library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI
964 +on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through
966 +and redirected to stderr.
970 +rsh host /some/where/try-from
973 +.BR hosts_access (5),
974 +.BR hosts_options (5),
977 +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
979 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
980 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
983 + * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50
985 + * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org>
988 +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
990 +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
991 +int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
993 --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600
994 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
996 int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len)
999 +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
1001 +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
1003 +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
1006 struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;